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 *Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
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        Attorneys for Appellee 
 
 
_____ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
_____ 
 
 
LAY, Circuit Judge. 
 
  Robert Taylor filed a Chapter 13 petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on 
November 19, 1992.  He had previously filed a Chapter 13 petition 
in Michigan.  The Michigan bankruptcy petition was dismissed on 
August 26, 1991.  In the Pennsylvania proceedings, the Internal 
Revenue Service filed an amended proof of claim for taxes from 
1987 and 1988,0 to which Taylor objected on the ground that the 
taxes at issue were not entitled to priority status because his 
petition in bankruptcy was filed more than three years after the 
due date of the relevant tax returns.0   
  The IRS replied that the three-year lookback period 
under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)(A)(i) was suspended during the 
pendency of Taylor's Michigan bankruptcy,0 when an automatic stay 
                                                           
0The claim was comprised of a secured claim of $600, an unsecured 
priority claim of $10,526.54, and an unsecured general claim of 
$4,189.43.    
0Taylor's 1987 and 1988 tax returns were the subject of this 
dispute.  His 1987 tax return was due, by virtue of an extension, 
on August 15, 1988.  Thus, four years, three months, and three 
days lapsed between the due date of Taylor's 1987 return and the 
filing of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy.  Taylor's 1988 tax return 
was due on April 15, 1989.  Thus, three years, seven months, and 
four days lapsed between the due date of the 1988 tax return and 
the filing of the Pennsylvania bankruptcy.   
0Section 507 provided in relevant part: 
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prevented the government from collecting his tax debt.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 362(a). The IRS argued that, excluding the period of the 
Michigan bankruptcy proceeding, less than three years had lapsed 
between the due dates of Taylor's returns and the filing of 
Taylor's bankruptcy petition in Pennsylvania.0 
  The Bankruptcy Court issued an order adopting the IRS's 
position.  The court held that the pendency of Taylor's Michigan 
bankruptcy proceeding tolled the three-year nondischargeability 
period for unpaid taxes.  The district court affirmed, and Taylor 
appeals.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the 
following order:  
 
* * * * * * 
 
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, 
only to the extent that such claims are for --  
 
(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts --  
 
(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the 
date of the filing of the petition for which a 
return, if required, is last due, including 
extensions, after three years before the date of 
the filing of the petition; . . . . 
 
The 1994 amendments to § 507 assign the government eighth 
priority, but this change is not relevant to our appeal.  See 11 
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
0Excluding the period of the Michigan bankruptcy proceeding, 
roughly two years and seven months had lapsed between the due 
date of the 1987 return and the Pennsylvania filing; roughly one 
year and ten months had lapsed between the due date of the 1988 
return and the Pennsylvania filing. 
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DISCUSSION 
  The parties do not dispute that, but for the suspension 
of the three-year lookback period during the pendency of Taylor's 
Michigan bankruptcy proceeding, the IRS's tax claims are no 
longer entitled to priority under § 507(a).  Taylor contends that 
a strict construction of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) warrants the 
conclusion that his earlier bankruptcy proceeding in Michigan did 
not suspend the three-year lookback period.  Section 108(c) of 
the Bankruptcy Code suspends the limitations periods of certain 
nonbankruptcy statutes which create claims against a debtor in 
bankruptcy.  11 U.S.C. § 108(c).0  Taylor urges that it is 
erroneous to apply § 108(c) and 26 U.S.C. § 6503(h)0 to a concept 
                                                           
0Section 108(c) provides in relevant part:   
 
 Except as provided in section 524 of this title, 
if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a 
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a 
period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a 
court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against 
the debtor, . . . and such period has not expired 
before the date of the filing of the petition, then 
such period does not expire until the later of-- 
 
 (1) the end of such period, including any 
suspension of such period occurring on or after the 
commencement of the case; or 
 
 (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or 
expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or 
1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to 
such claim. 
026 U.S.C. § 6503(h) provides:   
 
Cases under Title 11 of the United States Code.  --  
The running of the period of limitations provided in 
section 6501 or 6502 on the making of assessments or 
collection shall, in a case under title 11 of the 
United States Code, be suspended for the period during 
which the Secretary is prohibited by reason of such 
-5- 
other than collection or assessment and notes that § 507(a) 
solely addresses priority among claims.  He suggests that, had 
Congress intended to grant governmental tax claims preferential 
treatment, it would have done so explicitly, because suspending 
the lookback period solely for the government creates inequities 
among unsecured creditors. Sections 507(a)(3) and (4), for 
instance, grant priority status to certain unsecured claims for 
wages or benefits earned or arising within 90 or 180 days prior 
to filing, respectively.  But if a bankruptcy were dismissed, 
Taylor asserts, those expenses yet unpaid would lose their 
priority status upon the debtor's subsequent filing of a second 
bankruptcy petition.0  It is asserted that the government should 
enjoy no such advantage.   
  We disagree.  First, the fact that there is no explicit 
provision within § 507(a)(7)(A)(i) which tolls the three-year 
lookback provision during a period when an automatic stay is in 
effect under § 362 cannot defeat the statutory purpose of either 
the Bankruptcy Code or the Internal Revenue Code.  To limit 
§ 507(a) in this regard would lead to absurd results, as the 
government would lose its priority claim to back taxes as a 
result of the taxpayer's abuse of the bankruptcy process.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
case from making the assessment or from collecting and 
-- 
 
  (1) for assessment, 60 days thereafter, and 
 
  (2) for collection, 6 months thereafter. 
0Taylor makes this assumption without citing any authority. To 
our knowledge, this issue has never been litigated. 
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  Taylor's proposed interpretation also ignores the 
overall statutory scheme behind a Chapter 13 proceeding.  A 
bankruptcy court may not confirm a Chapter 13 plan unless it 
provides for "full payment . . . of all claims entitled to 
priority under section 507" of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).  
Under the then controlling applicable terms of § 507, tax 
liabilities due not more than three years prior to the debtor's 
filing for bankruptcy were given seventh priority.  § 507(a).  
The filing of the debtor's petition for relief triggers the 
automatic stay as to "any act to collect, assess, or recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement" of 
the bankruptcy proceeding. § 362(a)(6).  The stay remains in 
effect until the debtor obtains a discharge or the case is closed 
or dismissed.  § 362(c)(2).  No discharge can be issued in a 
Chapter 13 case until the debtor completes payments or is granted 
a hardship discharge. § 1328(b)(1).0   
  The IRS was completely barred from collecting its pre-
bankruptcy tax claims during the pendency of the automatic stay 
under § 362(a).  No discharge occurred in the earlier Michigan 
bankruptcy proceeding.  By excepting tax priorities from 
discharge, Congress intended to "discourage recourse to 
bankruptcy as a facile device for evading tax obligations."  S. 
Rep. No. 1158, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2468, 2470 (describing the effect of similar 
provisions under former Bankruptcy Act).  It would be an absurd 
                                                           
0A hardship discharge does not absolve the debtor of priority tax 
obligations.  §§ 1328(c)(2), 523(a)(1)(A).  
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result if a debtor, rather than obtaining a complete discharge by 
paying a priority claim, could avoid the three-year lookback 
period by voluntarily dismissing a bankruptcy proceeding and 
thereafter urging that a portion of the three-year period has 
lapsed.  Surely Congress did not intend to tie the government's 
hands and then chide it for not throwing its stone.   
  Federal tolling provisions in general reflect a 
congressional concern that both creditors generally and the 
government in particular have adequate time to collect their 
debts. Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code "extends the statute 
of limitations for creditors in actions against the debtor, where 
the creditor is hampered from proceeding outside the bankruptcy 
court due to the [automatic stay] provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362."  
In re Brickley, 70 B.R. 113, 115 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986).  
Likewise, § 6503(h) of the Internal Revenue Code suspends the tax 
collection limitation period while the debtor's assets are in the 
custody or control of any court and for an additional six months 
after dismissal of the debtor's case.  
  The House Report's discussion of § 507 clearly assumed 
that the government's priority would apply even though the 
collection of taxes was stayed.  The Report reads: 
This priority replaces a similar priority provision now 
found in the Bankruptcy Act; the requirement that the 
taxes not have been reported is dropped and a time 
limit is imposed.  The priority should apply if 
assessment or collection is stayed whether or not the 
debtor reported the taxes.  Creditors are on notice 
that the taxes are being disputed, and the taxing 
authority has not had an adequate opportunity to assess 
or collect the taxes.  The time limit is imposed 
because the taxing authority should not be given 
-8- 
priority for taxes that are unassessed or uncollected 
through a lack of due diligence.   
H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6151 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted).0 
  The legislative history of § 507 also sets forth the 
reasons the government enjoyed priority status under the former 
Bankruptcy Act: 
A taxing authority is given preferred treatment because 
it is an involuntary creditor of the debtor.  It cannot 
choose its debtors, nor can it take security in advance 
of the time that taxes become due.  The Bankruptcy Act 
gives the taxing authority three years to pursue 
delinquent debtors and obtain secured status.  If a 
debtor files bankruptcy before that three-year period 
has run, the taxing authority is given a priority in 
order to compensate for its temporarily disadvantaged 
position. 
H. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 190 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6150.0 
                                                           
0Taylor does not contend his taxes were "uncollected through a 
lack of due diligence."  Id. 
0Significantly, the House Report continues: 
 
There is an additional reason for the priority.  
Because it takes a taxing authority time to locate and 
pursue delinquent tax debtors, taxes are made 
nondischargeable if they become legally due and owing 
within three years before bankruptcy.  An open-ended 
dischargeability policy would provide an opportunity 
for tax evasion through bankruptcy, by permitting 
discharge of tax debts before a taxing authority has an 
opportunity to collect any taxes due.  The priority is 
tied to this nondischargeability provision, in order to 
aid the debtor's fresh start.  By granting the 
nondischargeable tax a priority, more of it will be 
paid in the bankruptcy case, leaving less of a debt for 
the debtor after the case.   
 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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  Section 507 grants a priority for taxes on income that 
was taxable before bankruptcy and for which a return is last due 
within three years prior to the date of the filing of the 
petition. This section simply replaced a similar priority 
provision under the old Bankruptcy Act.  Bankruptcy Act, §§ 
17(a)(1)(c), 64(a)(4) (then codified, respectively, at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 35(a)(1)(c), 104(a)(4) (1970)).  
  The time limitations within § 507 merely reflect the 
existing limitation periods in income tax cases under 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 6501 and 6502, which are suspended during bankruptcy 
proceedings by § 6503(h).  Congress need not provide an explicit 
stay period under § 507 when the three-year limitation period is 
otherwise stayed under other provisions of the Act.  Priority 
status is directly tied to payment of the government's unsecured 
claims and the debtor's discharge.  The three-year limitation 
period, stayed under §§ 108(c) and 6503(h) as to assessment and 
collection, cannot affect the priority status provided to the 
government during a bankruptcy proceeding which did not otherwise 
culminate in payment of the government's claims and the attendant 
discharge of the debtor.  To hold otherwise would defeat long-
standing congressional concerns over nondischargeability and the 
disadvantaged status of the government as to unpaid taxes which 
led to enactment of the priority status in the first place. 
  In enacting § 507(a)(7)(A), Congress sought to strike a 
balance between three competing interests:  
(1) general creditors, who should not have the funds 
available for payment of debts exhausted by an 
excessive accumulation of taxes for past years; (2) the 
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debtor, whose "fresh start" should likewise not be 
burdened with such an accumulation; and (3) the tax 
collector, who should not lose taxes which he has not 
had reasonable time to collect or which the law has 
restrained him from collecting. 
S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800.  On the one hand, an accumulation 
of stale tax claims would defeat the purpose of rehabilitating 
the debtor with a fresh start.  Accordingly, Congress limited the 
lookback period to three years.  On the other hand, the 
government is unable to choose its debtors or otherwise to 
protect itself as would a secured creditor, and an open-ended 
dischargeability policy would permit the discharge of tax debts 
before the government has time to collect.   
  We deem it obvious that these sections, read together, 
evidence a congressional concern to preserve the collectability 
of tax claims.  Section 507(a)(7)(A)(i) simply provides priority 
as to those taxes which fall within the three-year limitation 
period. The extension of time provided within § 108(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code and § 6503(h) of the Internal Revenue Code would 
be meaningless if debtors could discharge their tax liability by 
filing successive bankruptcies.  As the Ninth Circuit has 
observed, § 108's incorporation of § 6503 "reflects a policy 
determination that it would be unfair to allow the statute [of 
limitations] to run against the government's right to enforce a 
tax lien when, even if the government did bring suit, it couldn't 
collect because it couldn't get at the taxpayer's assets."  In re 
West, 5 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting 
§ 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. 
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Ct. 1830 (1994); see also In re Richards, 994 F.2d 763, 765 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (noting that "Congress intended to give the government 
the benefit of certain time periods to pursue its collection 
efforts") (interpreting § 507(a)(7)(A)(ii)); In re Montoya, 965 
F.2d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 1992) (approving Brickley's conclusion 
that "such a result would sanction tax avoidance schemes since 
debtors could simply file a subsequent bankruptcy petition after 
three years had passed and deliberately avoid paying their tax 
debts"); Brickley, 70 B.R. at 116 ("Congress did not intend to 
allow tax avoidance through bankruptcy by permitting the 
discharge of the debtor before the taxing authority has had a 
fair opportunity to collect taxes due.").  Federal law was 
designed to safeguard against tax avoidance.  
  In summary, it seems clear that Congress intended to 
provide the government a full and unimpeded three years to 
collect income taxes; it did not intend to leave a loophole for 
debtors to engage in tax avoidance, as "the burden of making up 
the revenues thus lost must be shifted to other taxpayers."  S. 
Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800; see also United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989) (departure from strict 
construction of Bankruptcy Code is warranted if it would 
"conflict with any other section of the Code, or with any 
important state or federal interest," or "a contrary view 
suggested by the legislative history") (footnote omitted).0 
                                                           
0Taylor also contends the government could have protected its 
interests during the pendency of the Michigan bankruptcy by 
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  The judgment of the district court is affirmed.   
           AFFIRMED. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
filing a Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay, which, he 
notes, would have been granted upon a showing of cause.  11 
U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, although in a 
different context, this argument "assumes relief from the stay 
would have been granted," In re Hunters Run, Ltd. Partnership, 
875 F.2d 1425, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989), and would require the 
government to do something to perfect its tax lien which the Code 
does not require, id.  It is unreasonable to suggest, 
particularly after the fact, that the bankruptcy court could have 
been expected to grant relief beyond that contemplated by payment 
of the government under the installment plan. 
